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Impact of Maritime Non-traditional Security 
Factors on Marine Legal Order
GONG Yingchun*
Abstract: Since the adoption of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the “Convention”), some new issues, 
which were not regulated by the Convention or regulated only in principle, 
emerged. Therefore, a number of countries started to explore security modalities in 
the new situation. Facing non-traditional security factors, such as piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, maritime terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
certain countries extended the scope of jurisdiction of non-flag States over the 
high seas and other sea areas by concluding special treaties or amending existing 
international treaties; while the United States, Japan and other countries or groups 
of countries have, through their domestic laws or State practices, taken unilateral 
actions, by “filling-in” or “specific” application of the “blank” parts of the 
Convention which are not specifically regulated or parts which are regulated only 
in principle, in order to shape a new system or order in their favor. The endeavor 
of Japan to build a multilateral maritime security mechanism in Asia with maritime 
joint law enforcement as the ultimate goal may significantly impact the current 
status of maritime order in Asian Pacific region.
International Law does not prohibit a State from entrusting the exercise of 
jurisdiction over matters within the jurisdiction of its national sovereignty to 
another State voluntarily, or by way of concluding regional agreements or granting 
prior authorization, therefore, joint law enforcement at sea is feasible in law, and 
some precedents can also be found in State practice. However, maritime joint law 
enforcement also implies a range of questions worthy of studying in international 
law: such as the relationship between multinational law enforcement and the 
principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas; the international law basis for
*         GONG Yingchun, Ph. D. in laws, Keio University, Japan; lecturer from International Law 
Teaching and Research Office, China Foreign Affairs University.
© THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW
Impact of Maritime Non-traditional Security Factors on Marine Legal Order 593
a third State to participate in maritime law enforcement; and the relationship be-
tween a third State, authorized by a coastal State, exercising jurisdiction over 
foreign ships within the territorial waters of the coastal State, and the principle of 
the innocent passage through the territorial waters, etc. In the future, the building 
of multilateral maritime security mechanism in the region and its tendency deserve 
close attention.
Key Words: Non-traditional security factors; Ocean peace-keeping; Multila-
teral maritime security mechanism; Maritime joint law enforcement
I. Emergence of Non-traditional Security Factors 
    in the Marine Sector
Since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(hereinafter the “Convention” or the “UNCLOS”) in 1982, 25 years elapsed. 
During this period, some new issues, which did not exist at the drafting stage of the 
Convention and for which the Convention did not provide, emerged. For example, 
bigger and more oil tankers pose increased potential threat of large-scale maritime 
pollution to coastal States of international straits and other international waterways. 
Accordingly, some coastal States advocate user States of the Straits should jointly 
bear the burden of maintaining the safety and security of the waterways and 
prevention of tanker pollution.1
After the September 11 attacks, the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) aiming to prevent weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons 
contains interdiction principles concerning ship boarding and inspection, which 
are apparently not consistent with the principle of innocent passage through the 
territorial waters and flag State jurisdiction over the exclusive economic zone as 
provided under the UNCLOS. Objectively speaking, such an initiative is in line 
with the security concerns of some States, therefore, under the pressure from the 
US, more States are inclined to participate in the PSI. Nevertheless, establishing 
a regime beyond the UNCLOS inevitably affects the legal regime concerning 
jurisdiction of ships specified therein. 
Prompted by the concern of and stirred up by the threat posed by terrorists 
1     Gong Yingchun, Analysis of the Background and Current Status of the Obligations on 
Cooperation among the User-States of the Strait of Malacca, Foreign Affairs Review, No. 1, 
2006. (in Chinese)
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together with pirates to the security of the sea lanes in the Strait of Malacca, the 
coastal States of the Strait carried out joint patrols with others in the region in order 
to prevent maritime powers from seizing the opportunity to involve themselves in 
the defense affairs of the Strait. The change of their attitudes towards joint patrols 
from refusal to active acceptance, especially the move of inviting in Thailand, a 
State not bordering the Strait, reflects a new development in the joint maintenance 
of maritime security of Southeast Asian countries. 
In addition, UNCLOS limits lieu of piracy “on the high seas, or in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State” (Article 101), therefore, the provision of 
Article 105 of the Convention, that every State may exercise universal jurisdiction 
over a pirate ship or aircraft does not apply to similar acts occurred within the 
territorial waters of the coastal States. Acts of armed robbery at sea against foreign 
cargo vessels and crew, such as looting, kidnapping, even killing, committed in 
recent years in the territorial waters of Indonesia, Malaysia and other coastal States, 
which are also straits used for international navigation, do not fall within the scope 
of the definition of piracy of the UNCLOS. How to combat effectively such crimes 
at sea has become a new problem for the coastal States and the user States of 
straits.
Due to different national circumstances, the non-traditional security factors 
and priorities involved in solving them vary from one country to another.2 It 
is almost impossible to enumerate all the elements of maritime non-traditional 
security factors with traditional and non-traditional security boundaries and scope 
of non-traditional security factors unidentified. However, non-traditional security 
factors in the marine sector should at least have the characteristics of universality 
and trans-nationality. Issues of maritime terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea, 
large-scale marine pollution, illegal maritime migration, drug and arms smuggling, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons should all be 
included in the list of maritime non-traditional security factors.
II. Impact of Maritime Non-traditional Security Factors
     on Marine Legal Order
The emergence of maritime non-traditional security factors has effected to a 
2      Wang Yizhou, China and Non-Traditional Security, International Economics Review, No. 6, 
2004. (in Chinese)
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certain degree the regime of jurisdiction over ships on the high seas established by 
the UNCLOS. Specifically, on the high seas and in the exclusive economic zones, 
exceptions to the application of flag State jurisdiction increased, the principle of 
flag State jurisdiction has been challenged to a certain extent. This challenge is 
reflected in two ways: one is the extension of non-flag State jurisdiction on the 
high seas and other waters by concluding special treaties or amending existing 
international treaties. The other is: some maritime powers or groups of countries 
have taken unilateral actions, by “filling-in” or “specific” application of the “blank” 
parts of the Convention which are not specifically regulated or parts which are 
regulated only in principle, in order to shape a new system or order in their favor.
Example of the first case: through the amendments to the 1988 Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA Convention) and its Protocol,3 member States of the International Maritime 
Organization empower parties States to the Amendments to exercise jurisdiction 
over ships of other States parties to the Convention outside the territorial waters of 
the coastal State, which carry weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical 
weapons and other materials prohibited by international treaties, including stopping, 
boarding and inspecting such ships. Before the revision, the SUA Convention only 
provided that States parties had the contentious jurisdiction over suspects who may 
have committed offenses endangering the safety of maritime navigation, as well as 
the obligation of prosecution or extradition, but jurisdiction over the ship itself was 
vested in the flag State. But after the revision, the SUA Convention granted State 
parties jurisdiction of stopping, boarding, searching, and questioning ships of other 
States parties. Article 8 bis of the SUA Convention stipulates, measures such as 
boarding and searching a suspected ship require authorization of the flag State, but 
at the same time, it provides also that when a State party’s governmental ship finds 
a suspicious ship in the waters outside the territorial waters of the coastal State, the 
State party is entitled to request the flag State claimed by the suspected ship (which 
should be a State party as well) to confirm the nationality of the ship, and if the 
flag State does not respond within four hours, it can be presumed that the flag State 
has already acquiesced to the requesting State’s exercising of stopping, boarding, 
3     IMO Document, LEG/CONF.15/DC/1, 13 October 2005, adopted by the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Revision of the SUA Treaties, 10‒14 October 2005, at http://www.imo.
org.
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searching, and questioning.4
A typical example for the latter is the reflection in 2005 Amendments to SUA 
and its Protocol of the interdiction principle of the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) promoted unilaterally by the United States, and the elements of the bilateral 
ship boarding agreements signed between the United States and Liberia, Panama, 
the Marshall Islands and other States of flags of convenience.5 The revision of SUA 
Convention and its Protocol was a specific act of the United States “in an effort to 
strengthen international law and relevant international framework in an appropriate 
manner when necessary”, after its announcement in September 2003 of the PSI 
Statement of Interdiction Principles.
State practice of Japan in building a multilateral maritime security mechanism 
in Asia relates to the latter case as well. Japan’s exploration in legal theory and 
its State practice in area of maritime joint law enforcement could have significant 
impact on the current status of maritime order in Asian Pacific region.
III. Japan and the Building of Multilateral 
       Maritime Security Mechanism
In recent years, many Japanese scholars and policy researchers advocate that: 
as a maritime State, Japan should, from national strategic point of view, make 
use of its advantages in terms of policy imagination, leadership and financial 
strength, take the lead in the marine affairs and the building of maritime order in 
Asian Pacific region together with the coastal countries and island countries in the 
region.6 In the area of maritime security, the researchers of the National Institute 
for Defense Studies (NIDS) of the Ministry of Defense of Japan proposed a 
4     That provision concerning acquiescence requires State party’s commitment of prior 
acceptance by way of written notification to the Secretary-General upon or after depositing 
its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. This commitment can be 
withdrawn at any time.
5       It is specifically reflected in the following aspects: the objects subject to the PSI is the 
offences provided for under the 2005 Amendments to SUA and its Protocol; a State party 
may exercise jurisdiction over the ship of a flag State under certain circumstance; and the 
4-hour rule is established. 
6      Takeda Isami, Cooperation among Islands States in the Asian-Pacific Region: Asian Islands 
States Forum (Research Program on Cooperation among Islands States in the Asian-Pacific 
Region), at http://www.tkfd.or. jp/division/public/asia/pdf/2003shimaguni.pdf, 20 October 
2003 (in Japanese); Masahiro Akiyama, Yoshida and Maritime State ‒ Japan, at http://www.
sof.or.jp/ocean/newsletter/077/a0l.php, 15 October 2003. (in Japanese)
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strategic vision of multilateral maritime security mechanism - Ocean-peace keeping 
(OPK) as early as 1996. Southeast Asian countries did not respond positively to 
the Japanese proposal at that time, due to their attitude of vigilance towards OPK 
actions with Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force as a main participant. However, 
in the following years, Japan modified the idea of OPK: with the strategic objective 
of building a multilateral maritime security mechanism led by Japan unchanged, 
they diminished the military nature of the idea of OPK by “utilizing military power 
for policing purpose”.7 Since 2000, Japan has strengthened bilateral co-operations 
with Southeast Asian countries in the field of maritime security, with Japan Coast 
Guard,8 which is responsible for maritime police tasks, as the principal organ of 
external cooperation. Through semi-official and non-governmental organizations 
such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Nippon Foundation 
etc., Japan assisted Southeast Asian countries in creating their Coast Guards and 
aided them in personnel, technology and equipment. On this basis, Japan promoted 
the shaping of a Japan-led Asian multilateral anti-piracy cooperation mechanism. 
This mechanism has laid a foundation for the eventual establishment of a 
multilateral maritime security mechanism under the auspices of Japan, established 
a framework, and reserved talents. Another purpose of Japan coming forward to 
build maritime multilateral security mechanism in Asian Pacific region is to “help 
the United States to fill the security gap caused by its not being able to intervene 
directly in the affairs of the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait militarily, due 
to political and other factors.”9
A. Putting Forward the Concept of OPK
OPK is a new concept first proposed in 1996 by researchers of the NIDS of the 
Ministry of Defense of Japan. In June 1998, Susumu Takai, director of First Research 
Office, NIDS, wrote an article devoted to OPK, which explored its meaning, basis 
7      Speech by Minister of State for Defense SHIGERU ISHIBA at the IISS Asia Security 
Conference, Singapore, 5 June 2004, at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dia-
logue/2004-speech-archive/second-plenary-shigeru-ishiba, 19 August 2004. 
8       In 2000, the English name of Japanese Maritime Safety Agency was changed to Japan Coa-
st Guard.
9     Tokyo Foundation & Emergency Motions Committee for the New National Defense Pro-
gram Outline, 18 Motions Concerning the Drafting of the New National Defense Program 
Outline, at http://www.tkfd.or.jp/division/research/pr/pdf/2004_08_teigen.pdf, 21 August 
2004. (in Japanese)
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2006 No. 1)598
of operation, its subjects, methods, objects and scope of operation, the need for 
action and expected results, relationship between OPK and the building of regional 
security guarantee mechanism, and others: 10
1. Meaning and basis of operation of OPK. OPK refers to maritime joint law 
enforcement action of searching and banning acts in violation of the laws and 
regulations of the coastal States in the region, based on the UNCLOS, by maritime 
defense forces of the countries in the region, through regional agreements or 
acquirement of prior authorization from relevant countries.
2. Subjects, methods and objects of OPK operations. “Navy officials” of 
Asian-Pacific countries take frigates or aircrafts provided by Japan or the United 
States patrolling certain waters of the East China Sea, South China Sea, the Strait 
of Malacca and surrounding areas, carry out law enforcement actions, including 
stopping, searching and arresting ships suspected of violating the UNCLOS or 
domestic laws and regulations of the coastal States. However, such maritime 
peacekeeping operations should be preconditioned on regional agreements or prior 
authorization of the coastal States.
3. The necessity and tasks of OPK. Susumu Takai’s article demonstrates OPK 
from two perspectives. First, the UNCLOS stipulates the international obligations 
assumed by the coastal States in the sustainable use of fisheries resources 
and marine environment protection. In order to fulfill its treaty obligations, a 
coastal State is entitled to formulate domestic laws and implement effective law 
enforcement actions to exercise jurisdiction by taking such measures including 
stopping, searching, arresting the law-breaking foreign ships and bringing such 
ships to judicial procedures. If international rules or standards relating to marine 
environment protection are not applied by a coastal State due to incompleteness 
of its legal system or weak law enforcement force, or failure to take effective 
measures to provide appropriate protection and management of fisheries resources, 
an international litigation or arbitration may be brought against that State, and it 
would be liable for damages arising therefrom. On the other hand, sovereignty 
disputes with neighboring countries over islands may also render the scope of law 
enforcement of the coastal State uncertain, resulting in failure of the coastal State 
to fulfill effectively its obligations under the UNCLOS. In this regard, the author 
10     Susumu Takai, Introduction on the Study of OPK, at http://www.bk.dfma.or.jp/~sec/1998/06/
opk.htm, 21 September 1998 (in Japanese); Susumu Takai, OPK and Maritime Security 
Cooperation, NIDSNEWS, June, 2003. (in Japanese)
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proposes that, OPK operations with participation of maritime defense forces of 
a number of countries in the disputed waters are conducive to the promotion of 
political and military stability in the region and to the prevention of armed conflicts 
between States arising out of issues relating to sovereignty over and utilization of 
resource in the Spratly Islands and other islands. Thus, the tasks of OPK operations 
are not limited to the protection of the fisheries resources and marine environment 
of the coastal States, they also include the maintenance of the security of the 
regional sea routes and maritime lanes, as well as patrolling and law enforcement 
actions in the disputed waters.
4. Relationship between OPK and the building of the regional security 
guarantee mechanism. In the OPK operations, officials of one State may travel by 
ships and aircrafts of another State. Law enforcement officers may carry out law 
enforcement actions including stopping and searching suspected ships, collecting 
evidence of illegal behaviors, within the exclusive economic zones of their own 
country and that of the other countries. OPK operations may increase the awareness 
of relatedness of each State, and may help to maintain the regional security 
cooperation mechanism. Therefore, consideration should be given to setting up 
an international training center in Japan to provide education and training to 
officials dispatched by Asian Pacific countries in communication, operation and 
maintenance of ships and aircrafts, search methods, marine environment protection, 
fisheries resources protection and management, etc.
The original idea of OPK proposed by Japan did not receive positive responses 
from countries concerned, as its main participants would be the navies of the 
countries in the region, its scope of operation includes the exclusive economic 
zones of coastal States and even their territorial waters, it is based on regional 
agreements or transfer of jurisdiction from the coastal States, thus, after it was 
proposed, it encountered problems as “sovereign barriers”, “longstanding vigilance 
against Japan” of the Southeast Asian countries and financial difficulties.11
B. Concrete Steps Taken by Japan in Building a Multilateral 
     Maritime Security Mechanism
11    Yamada Hiroshi, Counter-terrorism Cooperation with South-East Asia is an Opportunity to 
for Japan to Grow, Japanese Power, No. 10, at http://www.tkfd.or.jp/publication/reserch/
chikaral0_5.Shtml, 22 July 2004. (in Japanese)
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The September 11 attacks and the recent rampant piracy in the waters around 
the Strait of Malacca made maritime security the focus of national concerns for 
some time. After 2002, the United States took the lead in a range of maritime 
security initiatives, such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), and 
promoted the revision of the 1988 SUA Convention and its Protocol. However, of 
above initiatives, the RMSI, which contains provisions of sending troops to the 
Strait of Malacca and direct involvement in defense affairs of the coastal States, 
was expressly opposed by Malaysia and Indonesia – coastal States of the Strait of 
Malacca.
While US direct military intervention was refused, Japan went another way, 
quietly building a multilateral maritime security mechanism in the region under the 
auspices of Japan through the following steps.
1. Formation of an Anti-piracy Cooperation Mechanism in Asia 
under the Auspices of Japan
In October 1999, the Panamanian-registered Japanese cargo ship, Alondra 
Rainbow, carrying aluminum block of 1.2 billion yen, was robbed by pirates in 
the Malacca Strait. The ship and its cargo were hijacked, and 17 crew members, 
including the Japanese captain were forced to drift at sea on life-raft before being 
rescued 10 days later by Thai fishermen. Japan seized this opportunity to establish 
an initial anti-piracy cooperation mechanism in Asia under its leadrship through 
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries at governmental and maritime guard 
agencies levels since 2000.
First, on governmental level, the Japanese Government hosted the “Regional 
Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships” with the 
participation of the coast guard agencies, officials of maritime policy authorities, 
ship-owner associations of 17 States and areas, including the 10 ASEAN 
countries, Japan, China, India, South Korea and others. An important outcome of 
the Conference was the adoption of the Asian Anti-piracy Challenges 2000. The 
document states that, in the fight against piracy, the coast guard agencies of the 
participating countries shall cooperate “to the extent possible” in pirate intelligence 
exchange, stopping and arresting ships, technical assistance and other aspects, and 
shall convene experts meetings of coast guard agencies of the participating States 
to discuss specific implementation measures.
Subsequently, Japan and Southeast Asian countries actively promoted the 
bilateral co-operations among them in the fight against piracy, through such 
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measures as exchange of views, intelligence gathering and joint training. In 
September 2000, the Japanese Government dispatched “Mission for Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”, consisting of officials from the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transport and Coast Guard, to the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia respectively, to exchange views 
on such matters as regional cooperation in the fight against piracy, the holding 
of relevant international meetings, Japan’s willingness to provide cooperation 
assistance, mutual visits of patrol vessels and joint exercises, convening of expert 
meetings and joint patrols.
With these preparations, in November 2000, the Japanese Coast Guard 
dispatched patrol vessels to visit India and Malaysia, and held joint anti-piracy 
exercises with each of them. After that, Japan held joint anti-piracy exercises with 
the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei in October and December 2001 and in 
March and August 2002 respectively.12
Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ship was held at Japan’s proposal in October 2001. As the ultimate goal 
of Japan was to establish a multilateral maritime security mechanism under the 
auspices of Japan, this meeting aimed to push the bilateral anti-piracy cooperation 
to become a multilateral one. At this conference, the representative of the Japanese 
Coast Guard put forward a proposal: to organize officials of coast guard agencies 
of several countries to conduct joint patrol on ocean areas frequented by pirates 
in patrol vessels or aircrafts. In fact, this proposal is but a modified version of 
the afore-mentioned OPK idea, with the only change of the participating body 
from Japan being the Coast Guard responsible for marine policing tasks, instead 
of Maritime Self-Defense Force. At the ASEAN +3 Summit held in Brunei in 
November 2001, Japan advocated the establishment of a legal framework in order 
to combat piracy and promote regional cooperation more effectively. Thereafter, 
at Japan’s initiative, 16 countries, including the 10 ASEAN countries, China, 
South Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Cambodia, participated in the drafting and 
development of the legal framework, resulting in the adoption in November 2004 
of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia. Up to now, the Japan-led anti-piracy cooperation mechanism 
in Asia was established by concluding regional agreement. As of January 2006, 
12     The Status Quo of Japan’s Piracy Problems and Countermeasures, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/gaiko/pirate/index.html, 19 July 2004. (in Japanese)
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Japan, Singapore, Laos, Thailand had completed domestic procedures for the 
signing and concluding of the agreement, sent notifications to the Government of 
Singapore, the agreed depositary. In addition, Cambodia, the Philippines and Brunei 
had also signed the agreement, but not yet completed their domestic procedures. 
The Agreement shall enter into force 90 days after the reception by the Government 
of Singapore of the notification from the 10th State party.
2. Assisting Southeast Asian Countries in the Creation of Coast Guards 
as well as Assistance in Personnel, Technology and Equipment
While promoting multilateral anti-piracy cooperation mechanism, Japan 
continues to strengthen its bilateral cooperation and exchanges with maritime law 
enforcement agencies of Southeast Asian countries in specific sectors, laying the 
foundation, establishing a framework and building a reserve of talents for a broader 
multilateral maritime security mechanism.
Due to insufficient and decentralized maritime law enforcement forces, most 
Southeast Asian countries welcomed the Japanese proposal of assisting their 
maritime law enforcement capacity building, helping to create their coast guards, 
and providing assistance in personnel, technology and equipment. Since 2001, 
Japan Coast Guard has been providing annual training courses for personnel 
from coast guard agencies of Asian countries in combating piracy, human 
smuggling, arms and drug smuggling and other crimes at sea. The Japan Coast 
Guard Academy has been accepting overseas students from related agencies of 15 
countries and areas in Asia since April 2001.13 Japanese ocean policy researchers 
also suggested that Japan should establish Asian Coast Guard Academy or similar 
training institutions to train more maritime law enforcement officials for the 
Southeast Asian countries, disseminate Japanese police culture, harmonize means 
of law enforcement and build a reserve of talents for future maritime joint law 
enforcement.14
a. Assistance to the Philippine Coast Guard
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) was created in 1968, affiliated to the 
Navy. Separated from the Navy in 1998, it is currently affiliated to the Department 
of Transportation and Communications. Since 2002, the Japan International 
13     The Status Quo of Japan’s Piracy Problems and Countermeasures, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/
mofaj/gaiko/pirate/index.html, 19 July 2004. (in Japanese) 
14      Tokyo Foundation, Asia-Pacific Island Countries Cooperation Forum (Research Program on
Asia-Pacific Island Countries Cooperation), 2004 Annual Study Report, at http://nippon.
zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2004/00312/contents/0010.htm, 27 October 2004. (in Japanese)
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Cooperation Agency (JICA) started a five-year training program for Philippine 
maritime security officials, with permanent presence of five officials from Japan 
Coast Guard in the Philippines to provide guidance to Philippine maritime law 
enforcement personnel in such areas as international law, use of search equipment, 
methods of arrest and evidence collection. In December 2004, the Japan Coast 
Guard dispatched vessels to Manila Bay and held joint training exercises there 
with the Philippine Coast Guard in maritime law enforcement, anti-piracy, and 
prevention of oil pollution. On January 24, 2006, Japan and the Philippines held 
their first maritime search and rescue training exercises in the waters at the east side 
of the Batang Island between the Philippines and China Taiwan.15
b. Assistance in the Establishment of Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Agency
In July 2003, Japan Coast Guard dispatched patrol vessels to visit Malaysia 
and carried out the “on-board training for coast guard agency personnel”.16 In 2004, 
Malaysia decided to set up the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA). 
Japan Coast Guard officials were involved in its creation. After the formal 
establishment of MMEA (with 800 staff) in February 2005, Japan continued to send 
officials of the Japan Coast Guard to provide training for the staff of MMEA. In 
addition, on April 25, 2006, Nippon Foundation also delivered to MMEA as a gift 
the ocean training vessel built for it at a cost of 830 million yen.17
c. Assistance in the Establishment of the Marine Police and Adjustment 
Agency - Marine Police Organ of Indonesia
The new administration of Indonesia since 1998 began consideration of setting 
up a marine police organ - marine police and adjustment agency. In March 2003, 
Japan Coast Guard dispatched three experts through the JICA to the National 
Development Planning Agency of Indonesia, in order to provide necessary 
recommendations to the upcoming Indonesian marine police organ in terms of its 
15    Tokyo Foundation, Asia-Pacific Island Countries Cooperation Forum (Research Program on 
Asia-Pacific Island Countries Cooperation), 2004 Annual Study Report, at http://nippon.
zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2004/00312/contents/0010.htm, 27 October 2004. (in Japanese)
16     International Cooperation Promoted by Japan Coast Guard, at http://www.kaiho. mlit.go.jp/
info/books/report2005/honpen/p114.html, 20 December 2005. (in Japanese)
17    Nippon Foundation, Regional Cooperation Should Be Established against Piracy and 
Maritime Terrorism, at http://www.nippon-foundation.or.jp/org/press/05141/051411.html, 
18 March 2006. (in Japanese)
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system, equipment and facilities to be furnished. 18 In January 2004, during his visit 
to Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura said that 
Japan was considering using the budget of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
in 2006 to provide to Indonesia with two or three medium-sized patrol vessels 
about 20 meters in size free of charge. 19 The reason why the size is limited to 20 
meters is that: providing bigger vessels of more than 30 meters might contradict 
to the requirement of “avoid being used for military purposes and contributing 
to international disputes” stipulated in “the principles of implementation of 
assistance” of the ODA.
Through assisting the existing and future coast guards of the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries in personnel training, technology 
and equipment, etc., Japan met the requirements of improving maritime law 
enforcement capacity of the recipient countries objectively in terms of human and 
material resources. Meanwhile, as assistance is provided through the agencies 
like JICA, Nippon Foundation and Japan Coast Guard, it is easier for the recipient 
countries to accept. However, as the maritime security agencies of the above-
mentioned countries in Southeast Asia are spin-offs of the armed forces, such as the 
Navy, the provision of assistance, including patrol vessels, by Japan has in fact a 
hidden military nature.
3. Establishing a Multilateral Maritime Security Mechanism under the 
auspices of Japan, in Order to Conduct Maritime Joint 
Law Enforcement in the Region
 In 2003, a study funded by Tokyo Foundation20 explained the steps and 
prospects of the multilateral maritime security mechanism being built by Japan 
as follows: by constructing “dots”, “lines”, and “areas”, a Japan-led multilateral 
maritime security mechanism would ultimately be established. The so-called 
“dots” mean the coast guards created by Southeast Asian countries; “lines” refer 
to connecting the dots to form lines by Japan through the provision of patrol 
18    Cooperation on and Assistance to Indonesia’s Idea of Setting up Its Coast Guard, at http://
www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhou/hl5/k200303l2/in-dex.html, 21 March 2006. (in 
Japanese)
19     Japan-Indonesia Joint Publication on Marine Issues, at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/
indonesia/ji_seimei/kh_m.html, 21 March 2006. (in Japanese)
20     Takeda Isami, Cooperation among Islands States in the Asian-Pacific Region: Asian Islands 
States Forum (Research Program on Cooperation among Islands States in the Asian-Pacific 
Region), at http://www.tkfd.or. jp/division/public/asia/pdf/2003shimaguni.pdf, 20 October 
2003. (in Japanese)
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vessels, personnel training and other assistance to the maritime guard authorities 
of Southeast Asian countries; “areas” refer to the expansion of Japan’s range of 
maritime patrol and law enforcement to areas - exclusive economic zones or even 
the territorial waters of coastal States, in which jurisdiction and enforcement 
activities could originally only be exercised by these States. This may be done by 
conducting joint law enforcement and patrol activities on the sea by Japan and 
above-mentioned Southeast Asian countries, and dispatching maritime police to 
ships of the other party, with prior authorization from relevant States.
The deliberate establishment by Japan, from dots to areas, a multilateral 
maritime security mechanism in Asia is clearly not aiming only to combat piracy 
and terrorism, but to reach far-reaching strategic goals. On December 10, 2004, 
the Japanese Cabinet meeting adopted the New National Defense Program Outline 
which determined Japan’s defense policy for the next 10 years. The Outline clearly 
stated for the first time “be vigilant to China’s moves of military modernization 
and constant expansion of its scope of ocean activities”. In addition, the views 
as “Taiwan should not be placed outside the multilateral maritime security 
mechanism”, “multilateral maritime security mechanism should be used flexibly 
to make it a complement to the Japan-US military alliance” proposed by Japanese 
ocean policy researchers explained to a certain extent Japan’s true intentions of 
building multilateral maritime security mechanism.
IV. Challenges Facing China
The emergence of non-traditional security factors in the marine sector, 
including  terrorism, piracy and armed robbery at sea, drugs and arms trade, 
proliferation of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction and large-scale 
pollution of the marine environment, puts dual pressures on the coastal States with 
weak maritime law enforcement capabilities: their  inability to fulfill effectively 
their obligations under the UNCLOS, and the intention of the United States, Japan 
and other military powers to intervene directly in their defense affairs. Compared 
with the direct military intervention of the United States, Southeast Asian countries 
have chosen to accept the new security concept of “military force for police 
purposes” advocated by Japan.
The Chinese Navy has put forward the concept of “Maritime Common 
China Oceans Law Review (Vol. 2006 No. 1)606
Security” 21 and the vision of building a maritime security system22, but compared 
to other States, China is in a disadvantageous position, lagging behind in theory 
construction, operational deployment, financing, coordination among departments 
and technical support. China’s weak and decentralized maritime law enforcement 
forces remain unchanged, despite of the callings for improvement from parties 
concerned for many years. In contrast, Southeast Asian countries have been setting 
up maritime police organs modeled on Japan Coast Guard, bearing the influence of 
the Japanese police culture in terms of law enforcement methods, equipment and 
staffing. These moves tend to have a profound impact on the shaping of the future 
maritime order in the Asian-Pacific region.
It is worth noting that the vision of joint law enforcement proposed by 
Japan is preconditioned on not violating the principles of the UNCLOS and other 
international laws. Japan stressed that, the joint law enforcement operations must 
be based on regional agreements or the prior authorization from the coastal States 
concerned. Therefore, from a legal perspective, in practice, joint law enforcement 
operations carried out under any of one of the cases do not violate international 
law, as international law does not prohibit a State from voluntarily entrusting other 
States to exercise jurisdiction over matters within its sovereign jurisdiction on its 
behalf. In this connection, even in case that a flag State does not agree to or does 
not participate in joint law enforcement, its ships violating laws and decrees of a 
coastal State in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea of that coastal 
State, should be subject to joint law enforcement operations with prior authorization 
from the coastal State concerned. Once accepted by the countries in the region, this 
modality of maritime joint law enforcement would have a profound impact on the 
existing maritime legal system.
For example, the following case might appear: while exercising the right of 
hot pursuit against a foreign ship violating its national laws and decrees, a coastal 
State may request multinational hot pursuit operation involving maritime law 
enforcement forces of a third country or countries. In fact, multinational hot pursuit 
operation is not without precedents. On August 7, 2003, Australia began a 21-
day hot pursuit, covering 3,900 nautical miles, from its exclusive economic zone 
21     Building an Effective Maritime Security System, Guangming Daily, 11 January 2006, p. 9. 
(in Chinese)
22    Duan Yanzhi, Zhang Xiaofeng, East Asian Geo-strategic Environment and Chinese Mari-
time Security, Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, No. 4, 2004, at http://iaps.cass.cn/Bak/
ddyt/0404-1.htm, 21 November 2005. (in Chinese) 
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against a Uruguayan registered boat which illegally caught toothfish in its exclusive 
economic zone. In the process, at the request of Australia, government vessels 
of South Africa and the United Kingdom joined in the hot pursuit. Eventually, 
Australian Customs and Fisheries officials approached the Uruguayan fishing boat 
by first travelling by British government vessel and then taking two Australian 
boats. Afterwards, the officials carried out law enforcement activities including 
boarding and inspecting the boat.23 However, such joint law enforcement operations 
also involve a range of issues in international law, e.g., relationship between joint 
law enforcement and the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas; 
international law basis for the participation of a third party whose legal rights and 
interests have not been infringed, although authorized by the coastal State; the 
relationship between the exercise of jurisdiction over the ships of another State by 
a third State in the territorial waters of the coastal State with authorization of that 
coastal State and the principle of innocent passage in the territorial waters. In this 
regard, it is necessary to carry out a more detailed legal research in the future.
In conclusion, non-traditional security threats in the marine sector have 
resulted in the emergence of security gaps which have been not covered by the 
existing international maritime legal system and the traditional military alliances. 
That is because non-traditional security threats are universal and transnational, and 
also interrelated and convertible with traditional security threats. Therefore, some 
countries began to explore modalities of security mechanism in the new situation 
while maintaining existing military alliance. In the Asian-Pacific region, Japan is 
undoubtedly in the forefront. The multilateral anti-piracy cooperation mechanism 
led by Japan provides to a large extent a prototype to the multilateral strategic 
alliance in the region intended by the United States, while cleverly avoiding the 
possible political risks of arousing vigilance of other countries in the region.24 
In the face of the multilateral maritime security mechanism being established 
under the auspices of Japan and the United States, China needs to continue to 
23    In this case, Australia which was exercising the right to hot pursuit, UK and South Africa, 
which participated in the hot pursuit, as well as the flag State of the ship being hot pursued 
Uruguayan were all State parties to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, which took effect in 1982. Molenaar E. J., Multilateral Hot Pursuit and 
Illegal Fishing in the Southern Ocean: The Pursuits of the Viarsa and the South Tomi, The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 19, 2004, pp. 20~22.
24    Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the South-
west Pacific: Status and Prospects, Working Paper No. 7, Royal Australian Navy, Sea Power 
Centre and Centre for Maritime Policy, October 2001.
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advocate in various security dialogues new security concepts of mutual security, 
comprehensive security, coordinated security and cooperative security; and on the 
other hand, China should proactively participate in the process of the shaping of the 
mechanism, in order to grasp the tendency of the regional maritime order to prevent 
its development from going towards the direction of paramilitary alliances.
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